US economic sanctions against Burma's military junta have again become a much-discussed issue since the release of the country's democratic leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. Within days of being freed, Suu Kyi faced a barrage of questions about her stance on this issue, as if she held the master key to unlocking Washington's ban on doing business with Burma.
This view was recently given some support by a recent article by The Washington Times (“Suu Kyi seeks to review sanctions on Myanmar”), which quoted an unnamed congressional source as saying
that “several members of Congress are looking to Mrs Suu Kyi for guidance” on the issue of sanctions. “If they see her taking a more pragmatic and conciliatory approach, it would create a lot more space for a more flexible position,” the source said.
However, Suu Kyi has already indicated that her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), is willing to review its policy on sanctions, especially if they are found to be, as critics contend, more damaging to ordinary Burmese than to the regime.
“If we find that the sanctions are only hurting the people and that there is no positive outcome as a result of the sanctions, then certainly we would consider calling on those who have imposed sanctions to think whether it is not time to stop them,” she said in a phone interview for the article.
But she also noted that “it is not as easy as saying, 'Well, we think that it's time for sanctions to be lifted.'”
As Suu Kyi is well aware, it is entirely up to the US government to decide what changes, if any, it will make to its sanctions policy. Her own party's decision on the matter will be just one consideration in determining whether the President Barack Obama and US lawmakers chose to stop blocking bilateral and multilateral assistance to the regime and start allowing US corporations to begin investing in Burma again.
Although Burma's pro-democracy movement enjoys strong support from both parties in Congress, where a number of laws have been enacted since 1996 to put pressure on the Burmese regime, US lawmakers are not going to change their position overnight. The laws that are already in place set clear benchmarks for lifting the sanctions imposed on Burma, and both Congress and the Obama Administration are obliged to use them as the basis for any decision they may make.
The toughest of these laws, the “Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003,” states that all political prisoners in Burma must be released before sanctions can be lifted. The law, which was a response to a deadly attack on NLD supporters by junta-backed thugs in Depayin in May 2003, also requires that the regime respect the basic freedoms of Burmese citizens, such as freedom of speech, association and assembly, and restore press freedom. To date, none of these benchmarks have been met.
Another major hurdle to lifting the sanctions is found in Section 3 of the 2003 Act, the “Ban Against Trade That Supports the Military Regime of Burma.” Among the targets of this section is the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) and any successor entity. Therefore, according to this law, the leaders of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which won nearly 80 percent of the elected seats in parliament in the Nov. 7 election, are subject to the US sanctions.
The act gives the president the power to waive the enforcement of the provisions included in the law, but this can only be done if it is deemed to be in US national interests, and only after notifying the relevant congressional committees. Therefore, the withdrawal of any US economic sanctions, partially or fully, will be based on the national interests of the US, not on Suu Kyi's request.
Suu Kyi clearly understood this when she sent two personal letters to junta chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe in 2009, expressing her willingness to cooperate with him on the issue of lifting the economic sanctions. However, her requests to discuss the matter with the regime were ignored.
Lifting the sanctions will also require the president to withdraw the executive order, first enacted by former President Bill Clinton in 1997 and subsequently renewed by his successors, declaring that the regime's “large-scale repression of the democratic opposition in Burma ... constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”
This order is subject to regular reviews by the US State Department and is renewed on an annual basis. If these reviews showed a significant improvement in the situation in Burma, the president could chose not to renew the order, thus setting the stage for a fundamental shift in policy.
This view was recently given some support by a recent article by The Washington Times (“Suu Kyi seeks to review sanctions on Myanmar”), which quoted an unnamed congressional source as saying
that “several members of Congress are looking to Mrs Suu Kyi for guidance” on the issue of sanctions. “If they see her taking a more pragmatic and conciliatory approach, it would create a lot more space for a more flexible position,” the source said.
However, Suu Kyi has already indicated that her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), is willing to review its policy on sanctions, especially if they are found to be, as critics contend, more damaging to ordinary Burmese than to the regime.
“If we find that the sanctions are only hurting the people and that there is no positive outcome as a result of the sanctions, then certainly we would consider calling on those who have imposed sanctions to think whether it is not time to stop them,” she said in a phone interview for the article.
But she also noted that “it is not as easy as saying, 'Well, we think that it's time for sanctions to be lifted.'”
As Suu Kyi is well aware, it is entirely up to the US government to decide what changes, if any, it will make to its sanctions policy. Her own party's decision on the matter will be just one consideration in determining whether the President Barack Obama and US lawmakers chose to stop blocking bilateral and multilateral assistance to the regime and start allowing US corporations to begin investing in Burma again.
Although Burma's pro-democracy movement enjoys strong support from both parties in Congress, where a number of laws have been enacted since 1996 to put pressure on the Burmese regime, US lawmakers are not going to change their position overnight. The laws that are already in place set clear benchmarks for lifting the sanctions imposed on Burma, and both Congress and the Obama Administration are obliged to use them as the basis for any decision they may make.
The toughest of these laws, the “Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003,” states that all political prisoners in Burma must be released before sanctions can be lifted. The law, which was a response to a deadly attack on NLD supporters by junta-backed thugs in Depayin in May 2003, also requires that the regime respect the basic freedoms of Burmese citizens, such as freedom of speech, association and assembly, and restore press freedom. To date, none of these benchmarks have been met.
Another major hurdle to lifting the sanctions is found in Section 3 of the 2003 Act, the “Ban Against Trade That Supports the Military Regime of Burma.” Among the targets of this section is the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) and any successor entity. Therefore, according to this law, the leaders of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which won nearly 80 percent of the elected seats in parliament in the Nov. 7 election, are subject to the US sanctions.
The act gives the president the power to waive the enforcement of the provisions included in the law, but this can only be done if it is deemed to be in US national interests, and only after notifying the relevant congressional committees. Therefore, the withdrawal of any US economic sanctions, partially or fully, will be based on the national interests of the US, not on Suu Kyi's request.
Suu Kyi clearly understood this when she sent two personal letters to junta chief Snr-Gen Than Shwe in 2009, expressing her willingness to cooperate with him on the issue of lifting the economic sanctions. However, her requests to discuss the matter with the regime were ignored.
Lifting the sanctions will also require the president to withdraw the executive order, first enacted by former President Bill Clinton in 1997 and subsequently renewed by his successors, declaring that the regime's “large-scale repression of the democratic opposition in Burma ... constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”
This order is subject to regular reviews by the US State Department and is renewed on an annual basis. If these reviews showed a significant improvement in the situation in Burma, the president could chose not to renew the order, thus setting the stage for a fundamental shift in policy.
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